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The Multilateral Treaty Reservation Revisited 
    
 
Abstract. In the State practice regarding the declarations of acceptance of the International Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction one can trace some disputed reservations containing proviso which under-
mine the obligation assumed regarding the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. One of the limitations 
is called reservation concerning multilateral treaty, otherwise known as the Vandenberg reservation 
or multilateral treaty reservation.  
 The article treats these reservations by examining their origin, contents and Court’s juris-
prudence on the matter. 
  According to the author the multilateral treaty reservations have destructive effect on the 
compulsory jurisdiction system, chiefly because the broad conception of interpretation of the 
“affected” States bars proceedings before the Court over disputes as to multilateral treaties 
concluded by a larger group of States, if not all the States party to the treaty are also parties in the 
proceedings before the Court. As for the other part of the reservation, that stipulation virtually 
invalidates the obligations assumed in declarations of acceptances, since it hampers the Court to 
deal with a dispute submitted to it unless the State making such a reservation in its declaration or, 
on the basis of reciprocity, the adverse party has agreed to the Court’s jurisdiction. The adverse 
effect of the reservation is all the more so since the multilateral treaty reservations expressly 
concern disputes with regard to treaty interpretation, and considerable part of the cases brought 
before the Court concern precisely such disputes. 
 
Keywords: multilateral treaty reservation, Vandenberg reservation, International Court of 
Justice, declarations of acceptance, optional clause   
 
 
The more than eighty years of State practice and the jurisprudence of the two 
World Courts revealed that States, while accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice or its predecessors that of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, join to their declarations of acceptance such 
reservations or limitations which raise the question whether the given State had 
made a real commitment toward the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In 
the literature of international law one of these limitations is called reservation 
concerning multilateral treaty, otherwise known as the Vandenberg reservation 
or multilateral treaty reservation, hereinafter for the sake of abbreviation we 
will use the term of “multilateral treaty reservation”. 
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1. Appearance of the reservation 
 
The appearance of multilateral treaty reservation is linked up with the 1946 
United States’ declaration under the optional clause accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.1 
 The origin of this limitation can be traced to the Memorandum which John 
Foster Dulles–head of the United States delegation to the United Nations General 
Assembly and later Foreign Secretary of State–sent to a subcommittee of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the s Senate on 10 July 1946. In his Memorandum 
Dulles explained that in case of disputes as to multilateral treaties it was 
possible that a matter at issue in the case might arise in relations not only 
between two States party to the given multilateral treaty and being in the case 
parties before the Court, but also between the other contracting parties to that 
treaty. In view of such matters it would be necessary to make clear that it was 
not compulsory to submit to the Court a dispute as to the given multilateral 
treaty solely on the ground that certain States party to the treaty were required 
to do so under the optional clause, the reason being that the other States party 
to the treaty had not undertaken to resort to the Court and thereby to become 
parties, so they were not bound by Article 94, of the Charter providing that 
each Member of the United Nations “undertakes to comply with the decision 
of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party”.2 It was 
on the basis of the Dulles Memorandum that on the proposal of Senator Vanden-
berg the Senate decided to also include in the United States declaration of 
acceptance the limitation that there should be excluded from the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction  
 
“disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all Parties to the treaty 
affected by the decision are also Parties to the case before the Court, or (2) 
the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction”. 
  
 1 The United States of America was not a member of  the optional clause system of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. In 1946 the Washington Government the first 
time made a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute. 
 2 On the Dulles Memorandum compare and see Anand, R. P.: The Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. New York, 1961. 220.; and Briggs, H. W.: 
Reservations to Acceptance of Compulsroy Jurisdiciton of the International Court of 
Justice. Recueil des Cours, 1958. 306–307. According to Briggs, Hudson called the Dulles 
Memorandum “a jumble of ideas”. 
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 It was characteristic of the Senators that, as is pointed out by Briggs, they 
had adopted the reservation without clarifying debate and without under-
standing its meaning and implications.3  
 According to Judge Ruda, Washington Government intended, by making 
that reservation, to avoid a situation in which it would be obliged to apply a 
multilateral treaty in certain way in line with the Court’s judgement, while the 
other States party to the treaty and not participating in the proceedings re-
mained free, to apply the treaty in different ways from that determined by the 
judgement of the Court, since according to Article 59, of the Statute the 
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of the particular case.4 
 Relying on the related Senate documents, Maus writes that the Senators were 
not aware at the time of the reservation’s modifying the jurisdiction already 
conferred to the Court and believed that by making that reservation they 
actually settled an issue.5 However, the solution of the problem is out of the 
question, for the reservation is vague and, as will be seen later, lends itself to 
various interpretations. 
 For that matter, Kelsen asserts that the wording of the reservation was 
modelled on Article 62, paragraph 1, of the Statute, which refers to “an interest 
of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case”, having the 
meaning that all parties to the multilateral treaty which may be affected by the 
decision of the Court are also parties to the case before the Court.6  
 The example of the American declaration of acceptance was followed by 
other States, with certain variations of the reservation found in several 
declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction.7 
 
 
  
 3 Briggs: op. cit. 307. 
 4 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. Separate Opinion of Judge Ruda. ICJ Reports, 1984. 456. 
 5 Maus, B.: Les réserves dans les declarations d’acceptation de la jurisdiction 
obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice. Genéve, 1959. 165. 
 6 Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. London, 1951. 530. 
 7 On this score see the declarations of acceptance by France (1947), India (1956), 
Liberia (1952), Malawi (1966), Mexico (1947), Pakistan (1948), The Philippines (1972), 
South Africa (1955) and The Sudan (1958). 
334 VANDA LAMM 
  
2. The notion problem of “being affected” 
 
The multilateral treaty reservation, given its uncertainty and vagueness, was 
criticized by numerous author in the literature on international law. What was 
most frequently written in criticism was that the reservation withdrew, at the 
will of the United States, a large fraction of legal disputes arising under multi-
lateral treaties covered by the optional clause.8 
 The vagueness of the reservation is manifested chiefly in the first part of the 
limitation and is linked to the phrase “all Parties to the treaty affected by the 
decision are also Parties to the case before the Court”. This passage raises two 
problems. The first concerns the question of who or what should be understood 
by the word “affected”: all the parties to the treaty or the multilateral treaty?9 
If the reference is to the parties, an answer should be given to the question of 
when a party to the treaty is to be deemed “affected”.10 If, on the other hand, it is 
the treaty that is to be considered “affected”, then “'affected” are, under the 
reservation, all parties to the treaty and hence all of them should participate 
in the proceedings before the Court. In other words, it is not clear whether 
the drafters of the Vandenberg reservation had in mind the participation in 
proceedings, over a dispute arising under a multilateral treaty, of all parties to 
that treaty or only of the parties affected by the dispute. This possibility of two 
different interpretations allows of a narrow and a broadly conception of the 
reservation, depending on whether the reference is to all parties to a multilateral 
treaty or only to the States affected by the dispute. 
 If the drafters of the reservation wanted to secure participation in the 
proceedings of all parties to a multilateral treaty, attainment of that aim is next 
to impossible in practice, since it would call for ensuring the presence of as 
many as 50 or 100 States before the Court, the examination of their written sub-
missions, etc. This in turn would present a task almost impossible to perform, let 
alone the uncertainty surrounding the intention of all States party to the treaty 
to become parties to the case before the Court, for it may well be imagined that 
several contracting parties have no interest whatever in having the given 
dispute decided by the Court. All these aspects may combine to result in that a 
dispute as to, for instance, the United Nations Charter or some other major 
multilateral treaty will in fact never be dealt with by the Court. 
  
 8 Waldock, C. H. M: Decline of the Optional Clause. The British Year Book of Inter-
national Law. 1954. 275. 
 9 Cf. Kelsen: op. cit. 530. 
 10 Anand: op. cit. 222. 
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 During; the 1970s the multilateral treaty reservations came to be formulated 
in clearer terms. Thus, for instance, the declarations of El Salvador (1973), 
India (1974) and The Philippines (1972) contain the literally uniform text “all 
parties to the treaty are parties to the case before the Court”. ELL . In this way 
the said reservations make it unambiguously clear that all States party to the 
multilateral treaty are to participate in the proceedings before the Court, which 
is to say that the States mentioned above included in their respective declarations 
of acceptance the broad conception of the reservation. In connection with these 
reservations I should like to refer to a statement by Judge Sette-Camara in the 
Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States); he observed that the broad conception of the reser-
vation might have rather far-reaching consequences and that such reservations 
would require the appearance before the Court all member States of the United 
Nations and of the Organization of American States, e.g., the Nicaragua Case, 
together with the original parties in the case.11  
 Judge Sir Robert Jennings, in his separete opinion delivered on the pre-
liminary objections in that same case termed as bizarre the idea for as many as 
20 to 30 States to participate in the proceedings, but, for all that, he considered 
that the declarant State was entitled to make such a reservation, the practical 
result is, that the Court had no jurisdiction in the absence of special agreement.12 
In his dissenting opinion joined to the judgement on the merits of the case the 
British Judge emphasised that, in spite of the difficulties connected with the 
reservation, the Court was under obligation to respect it and apply it.13 
 
 
3. Problems concerning participation of third States in the proceedings 
 
Those who are defending the Vandenberg reservation are usually arguing that 
this limitation serves to defend the interests of third States party to a given 
multilateral treaty. Such reasoning is not convincing because Articles 62, and 63, 
of the Statute expressly provide for safeguarding the interests of third States 
  
 11 Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Merits) Judgement of 27 June 1986. Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara. ICJ Reports, 
1986. 192. 
 12 Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings. ICJ Reports, 1984. 554. 
 13 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Merits), Judgement of 27 June 1986. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings. 
ICJ Reports, 1986. 529. 
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by entitling those States to intervene in the proceedings before the Court. There-
fore, as is rightly stated by Verhoeven, the reservation defends the interests of 
only one State, that which has written the reservation into its declaration of 
acceptance.14 
 A closer look at multilateral treaty reservations leads us to make the point 
that in certain cases safeguarding of the interests of third States may prove all 
too strong an asset, since a State or States party to the multilateral treaty may 
happen to have no interest whatever in having a dispute regarding the inter-
pretation or application of the treaty decided by the Court. On a broader 
conception of the Vandenberg reservation, the consent even of these States is 
required to proceedings before the Court, yet, under the reservation, these 
States are not obliged to participate in the proceedings, that is to say that they 
may refuse their participation. By so doing they undoubtedly defend their own 
interests, but, at the same time, they prejudice the interests of those States 
party to the treaty which, on the other hand, seek to have the dispute to be 
decided by the Court. At any rate, the reservation gives States a measure of 
manoeuvre to decide by themselves, despite their commitment undertaken in 
respect to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and 
actually on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular legal dispute may be 
dealt with by the Court. 
 In exploring a solution to these problems arising out of the Vandenberg 
reservation Louis Sohn suggested that the reservation should be reworded15 
to exclude from compulsory jurisdiction “disputes relating to a multilateral 
treaty, unless all the parties to that treaty have agreed that any decision 
rendered in any such dispute between two or more of them will be binding 
upon all of them ...” (my emphasis–V. L.).16 Lori Damrosch is critical of Sohn’s 
suggestion, which she believes to have more disadvantages than advantages, 
and she raises the question of its compatibility with Article 94, of the United 
Nations Charter and Article 59, of the Court’s Statute. The American professor 
is of the view that Sohn’s proposal purports to derogate from the binding 
  
 14 Cf. Verhoeven, J.: Le droit, le juge et la violence. Revue général de droit inter-
national. 1987. 1177. 
 15 After the withdrawal in 1986 of the United States declaration of acceptance of 1946 
experts of international law have written widely on what the new United States declaration 
of acceptance should contain, a draft of a new declaration prepared by Professor Louis 
Sohn. 
 16 On Sohn’s draft see Sohn, Louis B.: Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court and 
the United States Position: The Need to Improve the United States Declaration. In: Clark 
Arend, A. (ed.): The United States and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. University Press of America, 1986. 3–28. 
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character of the Court’s decisions in contentious cases, because the unanimous 
consent as mentioned in the proposal can hardly be expected to be given by 
States with no interest in a particular matter.17  Damrosch also tries to remedy 
the problems caused by the reservation by suggesting a formula that would 
deny the United States consent to jurisdiction if the case “concern the interests 
of third States”.18 
 Within the meaning of the Statute and the Rules of Court, intervention in 
the proceedings is the legal institution through which a third State may participate 
in contentious case before the Court in defence of its own interests. Without 
dwelling on questions of intervention in cases before the Court we can state that 
there exist in fact two ways of intervention, depending on whether intervention 
is based on Article 62, or Article 63, of the Statute.19 Under Article 62, States 
are empowered to intervene in a case if they consider that a legal interest of 
theirs may be affected, in that case the State may submit a request to the Court 
to be permitted to intervene. The permission may be granted or refused, upon 
the decision of the Court, considering whether or not the intervening State’s 
legal interests are affected by the proceedings instituted. 
 0n the other hand, Article 63, covers precisely a case which involves the 
interpretation of a multilateral treaty before the Court and in which, along with 
the disputants, the other States party to the treaty are permitted to intervene.20 
Intervention under Article 63, thus accords to the States party to a multilateral 
treaty the right to intervene. 
 Participation by third States in the proceedings before the Court under the 
Vandenberg reservation has some similarities with intervention under Article 
63. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the two situations. 
 (a) According to the Vandenberg reservation proceedings before the Court 
cannot take place unless the other States party to a multilateral treaty also 
participate therein–and the question of whether those States are affected by the 
decision of the Court or they include all States party to the multilateral treaty 
  
 17 Cf. Damrosch, Lori F.: Multilateral Disputes. In: Damrosch (ed.): The International 
Court of Justice at a Crossroads. New York, 1987. 398. 
 18 Ibid. 399. 
 19 On this score see Ruda, J. M.: Intervention before the International Court of Justice. 
In: Lowe, V.–Fitzmaurice, M. (ed.):  Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice. Essays 
in honour of Sir Robert Jennings. Cambridge, 1996. 487–502. 
 20 Article 63, reads as follows: “1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which 
states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall 
notify all such states forthwith. 2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the 
proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgement will be 
equally binding upon it”. 
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is of no relevance here–, the reservation practically exercises some sort of 
pressure on these States to participate in the proceedings, because the Court 
cannot decide on the legal dispute without their presence. By contrast, in the 
case of intervention under Article 63, of the Statute, it is exclusively for the 
affected State to decide whether to make use of its right to intervene. 
 (b) Under the general rule governing intervention it is for the Court to 
decide on intervention, even in the case of intervention under Article 63, since 
the treaty to be interpreted is determined by the Court, whereas under the 
Vandenberg reservation the Court is actually left without discretion to decide 
on the participation in the proceedings of States other than the original parties, 
because the reservation makes it to some extent an obligation of the States 
affected to participate in the proceedings or else the proceedings before the 
Court cannot take place at all. 
 In connection with the Vandenberg reservation the question also arises of 
what will be the position in the proceeding of the other States party to the multi-
lateral treaty. This is an open question, all the more so since the position in the 
proceedings of the intervening State is similarly awaiting full clarification. 
 It was in 1992, for the first time during the existence of the International 
Court of Justice, that the Court permitted a third State to intervene in the Case 
concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. 
Honduras). Until this case the literature on international law was also rather 
uncertain about the position in the proceedings of the intervening State.21 
Precisely for that reason the Court, when it permitted to Nicaragua’s inter-
vention in the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras,22 found it necessary 
to make certain statements concerning the status of the intervening State in the 
case.23 
 The Court held that the intervening State does not become a party to the 
proceedings and does not aquire the rights or become the subject of the 
obligations pertaining to parties under of the Statute, the Rules of Court, or 
general principles of procedural laws. At the same time, however, the inter-
vening State is also vested with certain rights, such as the submission of a 
written statement and right to be heard.24 
  
 21 Cf. Davi, A.: L'intervento davanti alla Corte Internazionále di Giustizia, Napoli, 1984. 
209–215. 
 22 For that matter, the case involved intervention under Article 62, of the Statue. 
 23 Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (Application by 
Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene), Judgement of l3 September 1990. ICJ Reports, 
1990, 135. 
 24 Ibid. 1990. 135–136. 
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 In respect to reservations concerning multilateral treaties this means that, 
on a broad conception of the reservation, for instance, all States party to multi-
lateral treaty (which may number 30 or 40 or even more) should participate in 
proceedings over a particular case, all invested with the right to be heard by 
the Court! It needs no further explanation that this would not be a viable path 
in practice. 
 If, on the other hand, the intervening State being a non-party in the case, 
the Court’s decision is not binding on it. In the Case concerning the Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute this reasoning was also practically upheld by the 
ad hoc chamber, composed of members of the Court, in dwelling on the 
question of res judicata and Article 59, of the Statute.25 In dealing with this 
matter Rosenne points out–along lines similar to the declaration, made by Judge 
Oda and attached to the judgement of 11 September 1992,26–that, since that case 
concerned a territorial dispute, the Court’s judgement was binding not only on 
the parties, but is valid erga omnes. Precisely for this reason, the Israeli professor 
stated that it was difficult to understand why the chamber did not somehow 
written into the judgement Nicaragua’s declaration, made at the time of sub-
mitting its request for intervention, that it would abide by the terms of the 
judgement.27 
 In respect of the Vandenberg reservation all this leads to the conclusion that 
if the Court should be seized on the basis of a multilateral treaty’s compromissory 
clause and the States party to the treaty also wishing to participate in the 
proceedings before the Court under the terms of the Vandenberg reservation, it 
can be taken as very likely that, having regard to the judgement in the Case 
concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, these States 
would be considered by the Court as non-parties in the proceedings and would 
also not be bound by the judgement of the Court. It is not sure, of course, that in 
a dispute as to a multilateral treaty the Court would by analogy apply its legal 
practice with regard to intervention, while it is unlikely that under the Vandenberg 
reservation the Court would recognize for third States participating in a case 
more rights than it had conceded to the intervening State in the Case con-
cerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute.  
 
 
  
 25 Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute. Judgement of 11 
September 1992. ICJ Reports, 1992. 135. 
 26 Cf. Ibid. Declaration of Judge Oda. 619–620. 
 27 Rosenne, Sh.: Intervention in the International Court of Justice. Dordrecht, Boston, 
London, 1993. 155. 
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4. The question of consent to proceeding 
 
The second part of multilateral treaty reservation, as contained in the United 
States declaration of acceptance and stipulating in fact an alternative condition, 
provides that in a dispute arising under a multilateral treaty the Court may not 
have jurisdiction “unless the United States of America specially agrees to juris-
diction”. This practically means nothing else than that disputes as to multi-
lateral treaties cannot be brought before the Court solely under the optional 
clause and that the consent of the State including the Vandenberg reservation 
in its declaration of acceptance–and, on the basis of reciprocity, that even of 
the adverse party–is required to proceedings in related matters. 
 Hudson asserts that this clause of the reservation shows a confusion of 
thought, for if the United States agrees to jurisdiction, it is virtually that consent 
which, functioning, as it were, as a special agreement, constitutes the basis for 
the Court’s jurisdiction, and therefore the question does not even emerge of the 
application of the declaration of acceptance.28 One can say that in respect of 
the reservation it is unclear whether the special consent of the United States 
practically replaces the declaration of acceptance and that lack of its consent 
entails disregard of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in disputes arising under 
multilateral treaties. According to Waldock, the reservation practically operates 
to preclude the United States from being brought before the Court in a dispute 
as to a multilateral treaty unless the United States specifically consents to 
jurisdiction after the case has arisen.29 
 In respect of multilateral treaty reservation the question also arises of how 
reciprocity affects this limitation, especially that part of it which requires even a 
separate consent of the declarant State to the Court’s jurisdiction, since according 
to the principle of reciprocity a reservation may be invoked by the opponent 
party as well. This entails that the reservation in a concrete case should be 
applied as if the party referring to it has also attached to the declaration of 
acceptance the clause that, in addition to the declaration accepting compulsory 
jurisdiction, its separate consent is required to the Court’s jurisdiction over 
disputes arising under multilateral treaties. One can conclude that the reser-
vations concerning multilateral treaties, in combination with the principle of 
reciprocity, nullify the obligations undertaken with regard to the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction, not only of the States including such limitation in 
  
 28 Hudson World Court–America’s Declaration Accepting Jurisdiction. 32 A. B. A. 
Journal (1946) 836. Quoted by Anand: op. cit. 221. 
 29 Waldock: op. cit. 274. 
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their declarations of acceptance, but in concrete cases the opponent party’s 
commitment regarding compulsory jurisdiction as well. 
  
 
5. The reservation in the practice of the Court  
 
In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice the reservations 
concerning multilateral treaties were considered for the first time in the Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.30 
 In its memorandum presented in response to Nicaragua’s application and in 
the course of the oral proceedings the United States advanced the point that 
Nicaragua had invoked in its application four multilateral treaties, the United 
Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States and the Havana Con-
vention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The 
Washington Government argued that since the dispute submitted to the Court 
“had arisen” under the treaties listed, the Court, under the Vandenberg reservation 
contained in the United States declaration of acceptance, may exercise juris-
diction only if all treaty parties affected by a prospective decision of the Court 
are also parties to the case. For its part, the American Government did name the 
said States (Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras) and maintained that if a 
single one of them was found by the Court to be “affected”, the United States 
reservation was to come into play.31 
 In its judgement on the preliminary objections the Court itself acknow-
ledged that the multilateral treaty reservation attached to the United States 
declaration of acceptance was vague and lent itself to two different inter-
pretations: “It is not clear whether what are “affected”, according to the terms 
of the proviso, are the treaties themselves or the parties to them”.32 So, in fact, 
the Court did nothing else than repeat the questions formulated in the literature 
of international law with respect to the reservation. Those questions were 
not, however, answered by the Court, and that for two reasons. First, because, 
  
 30 On this aspects of Nicaragua case see: Alexandrov, Stanimir A.: Reservations in 
Unilateral Declarations Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice. Dordrecht–Boston–London,  1995. 112–119. 
 31 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. ICJ 
Pleadings. vol. II. Cf. USA Counter-Memorial. Part III. 74–97. 
 32 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Juris-
diction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. ICJ Reports, 1984. 424. 
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according to the judgement, the reservation had been interpreted by the United 
States itself as applying only to States affected by the decision (i.e. Washington 
sought to apply the narrow conception of the reservation) and the three neigh-
bouring States that might be affected had also been indicated by Washington.33 
Second, the Court found that the reservation concerning multilateral treaties 
did not affect its jurisdiction in that case, as Nicaragua invoked a number of 
principles customary and general international law, which have been enshrined 
in the text of the convention relied upon by Nicaragua. The Court emphasized: 
  
“The fact that the above mentioned principles, recognized as such, have 
been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that 
they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even as 
regards countries that are parties to such conventions.”34  
 
 By taking this view the Court actually escaped application in the concrete 
case the multilateral treaty reservation. 
 Over and above these points the Court’s judgement covered the question of 
who vas to decide whether a State was or was not “affected”, according to the 
terms of the proviso, by a future decision of the Court. The Court held that 
should a State consider itself affected by the decision, it would either file an 
application itself or would submit a request for intervention.  
 The Court could identify the States “affected” only when the general outline 
of judgement to be given become clear.35 “Certainly the determination of the 
States ‘affected’ could not be left to the parties but must be made by the 
Court”.36 This line of the Court’s reasoning is similar to that of Kelsen, who, 
shortly after the Vandenberg reservation had appeared, wrote that the question 
of which States were affected by a decision of the Court can be decided 
“only after the Court had assumed and exercised jurisdiction in the dispute 
concerned”.37 
 
  
 33 For that matter, the United States did not but merely mention the other possible 
construction of the reservation, namely that which required participation in the proceedings 
of all States party to the multilateral treaties indicated. 
 34 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Juris-
diction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. ICJ Reports, 1984. 424. 
 35 Ibid. 425.  
 36 Ibid.  
 37 Kelsen: op. cit. 530. 
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 The question of “affected” States was likewise considered by the Court in 
dealing with the merits of the case, namely in the context of the extent to 
which the Court’s decision affected the rights of El Salvador and hence the 
Salvadorian State itself in the concrete case.38 The United States did not 
participate in that phase of the proceedings, but the Court considered at length 
the United States’ contention based on multilateral treaty reservation.39 In 
connection with the Vandenberg reservation the Court stated that  
 
“... the reservation does not require, as a condition for the exclusion of a 
dispute from the jurisdiction of the Court, that a State party  to the relevant 
treaty be ‘adversely’ or ‘prejudicially’ affected by the decision, even though 
this is clearly the case primary at view.”40  
 
In other words, application of the reservation does not require determining 
whether the State is unfavourably or otherwise “affected”; “the condition of 
the reservation is met if the State will necessarily be ‘affected’, in one way or 
the other”.41 The Court held that in the concrete case the multilateral treaty 
reservation operated as a bar to certain documents being invoked as multi-
lateral treaties, but it did not in any way affect the consideration of Nicaragua’s 
claims based on other sourcess international law.42 That is to say according 
to the Court, it had jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute 
to consider Nicaragua’s claims based upon customary international law, but it 
should exclude from its jurisdiction of disputes “arising under” the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States Charters.43 As for this finding, 
  
 38 In that case Washington contended that by the American activities carried out in El 
Salvador and protested against by Nicaragua it had exercised the right of collective self-
defence from a possible armed attack by Nicaragua and that collective self-defence was 
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as well as by the Charter of the Organization 
of American States. Therefore the dispute under consideration had arisen under multilateral 
treaties, to which El Salvador was also a party along with the United States and Nicaragua. 
Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. ICJ 
Pleadings. vol. II. 86–91. 
 39 On this score see the author’s Gondolatok a Nemzetközi Biróság eljárásától való távol-
maradásról (Reflections on the Non-appearance before the International Court of Justice). 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1982. 21–40. 
 40 Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Merits), Judgement of 27 June 1986. ICJ Reports, 1986. 37. 
 41 Ibid. 
 42 Ibid. 38. 
 43 Ibid. 97. 
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Judge Oda, in his dissenting; opinion joined to the judgement, expressed the 
view that the Court should have proved, not that it can apply customary and 
general international law independently, but that Nicaragua’s claims, had not 
arisen under these multilateral treaties” (the above-mentioned two multilateral 
treaties–V. L.).44 
 At any rate, the Court’s decision on the merits of the Nicaragua Case 
similarly failed to answer several important questions relating to multilateral 
treaty reservations, and, as is pointed out by Briggs, the Court disregarded the 
fact that a reservation stipulating that “all States party to a multilateral treaty 
and affected by the decision shall also participate in the proceedings” has a 
destructive effect on international adjudication and is incompatible with the 
Statute of the Court. Instead, the Court stuck to the term “affected State” with-
out thoroughly examining whether El Salvador’s rights were affected by the 
case at all or what was meant by that term in the context of Article 59, of the 
Statute, which provides that the decision of the Court has no binding forte 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.45 According to 
the well-known British expert, the Court was content to merely state that El 
Salvador was “affected”, but it did not say the same in respect of Honduras, 
albeit that country was the base of the operations against Nicaragua.46 
 In recent years the other case before the International Court of Justice, 
the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), 
similarly involved multilateral treaty reservations. In response to the Pakistan’s 
application India filed preliminary objection invoking, inter alia, the fact that 
its declaration of acceptance of 1974 contains the multilateral treaty reservation, 
which bars Pakistan from invoking the Court’s jurisdiction against India 
“concerning any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of a 
multilateral treaty, unless at the same time all the parties to such a treaty are 
also joined as parties to the case before the Court”. India contended that the 
United Nations Charter, on which Pakistan founded its claims, belonged 
exactly to the category of multilateral treaties to which the reservation applied. 
Apart from this, India gave no consent to anything and signed with Pakistan no 
special agreement derogating from the content of the reservation.  
 The multilateral treaty reservation was not considered in the case since, as 
mentioned earlier, the Court based itself an the Commonwealth reservation 
  
 44 Ibid. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda. 219. 
 45 Briggs, H. W.: The International Court of Justice Lives up to its Name. American 
Journal of International Law, 1987. 81. 
 46 Ibid. 
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joined to the Indian declaration of acceptance and found that it had no juris-
diction to entertain the application filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.47 
 From the foregoing it becomes clear that the multilateral treaty reservations 
have destructive effect on the compulsory jurisdiction system, chiefly because 
the broad conception of interpretation of the “affected” States bars proceedings 
before the Court over disputes as to multilateral treaties concluded by a larger 
group of States. As for the other part of the reservation, the said stipulation 
virtually invalidates the obligations assumed in declarations of acceptances, 
since it hampers the Court to deal with a dispute submitted to it unless the 
State making such a reservation in its declaration or, on the basis of reciprocity, 
the adverse party has agreed to the Court’s jurisdiction. All this is detrimental 
to judicial settlement of international disputes, all the more so since the multi-
lateral treaty reservations expressly concern disputes with regard to treaty 
interpretation, and considerable part of the cases brought before the Court 
involves precisely such disputes. 
 
 
6. The Vandenberg reservation and the Statute 
 
With regard to the reservations to declarations of acceptance one can meet with 
views expressed both before the Court and in the literature of international law 
to the effect that this or that reservation is “incompatible with the Statute”. 
References to incompatibility with the Statute appear to suggest that what we 
have are reservations to the Statute, although limitations to declarations of 
acceptance can in no way be considered as reservations to the Statute. Decla-
rations of acceptance are unilateral acts with proviso freely made up by States. 
Yet, no matter how free States may be to introduce conditions for or limitations to 
their declarations of acceptance, these declarations may not contradict to the 
Statute and must be in line the UN Charter, the Statute and the Rules of Court. 
While in several cases the Court has more or less clarified the question of 
incompatibility of certain reservations with the Statute, it did not give answer 
to the question of compatibility with the Statute of the truly “problematical” 
reservations, namely, among others, the multilateral treaty reservations. 
 The question of compatibility with obligations under the Statute and the 
optional clause arises in connection with multilateral treaty reservations, both 
with the first part of the reservation on account of its vagueness, as has been 
discussed already, and with the second part thereof, which requires the decla-
  
 47 Case concerning Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Jurisdiction of the Court) 
Judgement of 21 June 2000. ICJ Reports, 2000. para. 46. 
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rant State’s special consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. This part of the 
reservation is clearly contrary to the obligations under Article 36, paragraph 2, 
of the Statute and even to the spirit of the optional clause, namely that States 
declare to recognize “ipso facto” and without special agreement the jurisdiction 
of the Court.  
 Owing to the second part of the Vandenberg reservation the parties’ decla-
rations of acceptance become purposeless, the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
cannot come into play in disputes as to multilateral treaties, and such disputes 
cannot be considered by the Court unless the State including this reservation in 
its declaration–and, on the basis of reciprocity, the opponent party–specially 
agree to submit the dispute to the Court. 
 By this part of the multilateral treaty reservation the declarant State takes 
back the compulsory jurisdiction which it conferred on the Court by its accession 
to the optional clause system. Practically such is the case with the automatic or 
subjective domestic reservations the so called Connally reservations as well. 
This is perhaps even more readily perceptible with multilateral treaty reser-
vations than with subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations, for if in a legal 
dispute before the Court the State entitled decides not to invoke the subjective 
domestic jurisdiction reservation, the Court may go on with the proceedings 
without further consideration, as the application of the reservation is not 
automatic and parties should refer to it before the Court. In the case of 
multilateral treaty reservations the parties have no such “discretion” and, if one 
clings strictly to the wording of the reservation, the Court may not, in 
matters covered by the reservation, assume jurisdiction unless the parties 
specially agree thereto. Of course, multilateral treaty reservations may also 
happen not to be invoked, but in that event the Court’s jurisdiction is practically 
founded not on the declaration of acceptance, since under the reservation 
joined to the declaration the Court could not deal with the particular matter 
in any way, but on the forum prorogatum, i.e. on the parties’ consent to 
jurisdiction given in the process. 
 
 
7. Has the invalidity of the reservation any effect on the declaration  
 as a whole? 
 
In connection with multilateral treaty reservations the question arises of 
whether these reservations are valid at all and whether the eventual invalidity 
thereof carries implications for the declaration of acceptance itself. 
 Both the views of the judges of the International Court of Justice and the 
position of the literature of international law are divided as to the extent to 
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which an invalid reservation affects the declaration of acceptance itself. On 
one view, invalidity bears upon the declaration of acceptance as a whole, 
whereas on the other view invalidity has no effect on the declaration itself.  
 The question of separability of an invalid clause from the rest of the 
declaration arise in connection with the reservations concerning multilateral 
treaties, but this set of problems has received much less attention than the 
subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations have. In the Nicaragua Case 
Judge Mosler asks whether the declaration of acceptance as a whole is affected 
by the invalidity of the reservation.48 He, too, leaves this question unanswered, 
however, and the German Judge confines himself to stating that “If an affirmative 
conclusion were to be taken, its effect would be worse than to apply the 
reservation and to maintain the rest of the declaration”.49 In his separate opinion 
Judge Jennings dwells on whether the difficulties concerning the uncertainty of 
the exact meaning of the reservation do not render the whole reservation so 
vague that it can be discarded, which, however, leads on to the other question 
whether, since the reservation might be not severable from the declaration, it 
might render the entail American declaration of acceptance void.50 
 We, for our part, are of the view that the authors claiming that an invalid 
clause has no bearing on declarations of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction 
or on the reservation itself and that, apart from the invalid part, the rest of the 
declaration of acceptance remains operative are not proved right. If a reser-
vation or a clause attached to a declaration of acceptance is deemed non-
existent, while the rest of the declaration is recognized as valid, the obligations 
of the declarant State are increasing without the consent thereof, which 
contradicts to the jurisprudence of the two International Courts, that juris-
diction exists only within the limits expressly accepted by the parties and that 
it should be interpreted in a narrow sense. This was expressed in the judgement 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory Case 
and reiterated by both Courts in several other cases, stating that “… the 
Court’s jurisdiction is always a limited one, existing only in so far as States 
have accepted it...”.51 
  
 48 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 
November 1984. Separate Opinion of Judge Mosler. ICJ Reports, 1984. 469. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings. Ibid. 554–555. 
 51 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia and the Factory and Chorzów. Judgement 
(Jurisdiction), July 26, 1927. Hudson, M. O. (ed.): World Court Reports, 1920–1942. New 
York, 1972. vol. I. 610. 
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8. Effect of the Court’s eventual, nullity decision 
 
It would be primarily for the Court to decide the open questions concerning 
disputable reservations and their compatibility with the Statute. However, as 
the foregoing go to show clearly, in dealing with a variety of matters the Court 
has in fact avoided giving answers to these questions. 
 As mentioned already, the International Court of Justice did not decide 
upon the validity of the Vandenberg reservation. At the same time, however, 
the judgment delivered in the Norwegian Loans case (Norway v. France) 
suggests the conclusion that the Court recognized as valid an other also very 
disputed reservation, the subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations joined to 
French declaration of acceptance. In his separate opinion attached to the 
judgment in that case Judge Lauterpacht points out that an eventual decision of 
the Court holding that a declaration of acceptance including the above 
mentioned reservation would also have a bearing on the declarations by a 
number of States which have had no opportunity to express their view on the 
matter. According to the British judge, under Article 63, of the Statute the 
Court would have had to recognize the right of intervention for those States 
which had included the said reservation in their declarations. Since it failed to 
do so, the States concerned may take the position that by virtue of Article 59, 
of the Statute the Court’s decision is limited to the present case and may reserve 
themselves the right to express their views on this question in an another 
occasion.52 
 Those who challenge the International Court of Justice for having failed to 
take a different stand on the question of the validity of reservations with rather 
disputable contents are undoubtedly right at first glance, but if one examines 
this problem more carefully and probes into it in light of the Court’s possible 
findings on the matter, one must admit that the International Court of Justice 
was right to refrain from taking a definite stand on these delicate issues. 
 Had the Court decided that the multilateral treaty reservations or the subjec-
tive domestic jurisdiction reservations or the declarations containing such 
limitations were valid, it would obviously had exposed itself to sharp criticism 
on the one hand and would have undermined its own prestige and authority on 
the other. In addition, a definite stand of the International Court of Justice on 
clearly accepting as valid the contested reservations and the declarations 
accepting compulsory jurisdiction and containing such reservations would by 
  
 52 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans. Judgment of July 6th, 1957. Separate Opinion of 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. ICJ Reports, 1957. 63–64. 
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all means have afforded for States a kind of “encouragement” to incorporate 
such limitations in their declarations of acceptance. 
 The other avenue open to the Court would have been a pronouncement on 
the invalidity of declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction and containing 
disputed limitations to or reservations. 
  Abrogation in their entirety compulsory jurisdiction declarations containing 
subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations or multilateral treaty reservations 
would have resulted in the Court depriving such declarations of acceptance even 
of the small fraction of legal effect they have retained despite these reservations 
in respect to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 
Pronouncing the invalidity of declarations containing such reservations would 
have operated to rule out even the theoretical possibility of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction coming into play over matters not affected by the 
reservations or, should the parties still not invoke the said reservation for some 
reason, that of the Court deciding the legal dispute submitted to it. 
 
 
